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The EU VAT Treatment of Public Sector Bodies: 
Slowly Moving in the Wrong Direction
Dr. Rita de la Feria, Senior Research Fellow*
1. INTRODUCTION
In most countries that apply a value added tax (VAT), the 
activities and transactions undertaken by public sector 
bodies are not subject to full taxation.1 They are either 
deemed to be zero-rated, exempt, outside the scope of 
VAT, or, as in the case of EU VAT system, and depend-
ing on various circumstances, all of the above. The ration-
ale usually invoked to justify lack of full taxation is of a 
mixed conceptual and political kind. On one hand, public 
sector bodies have a diversifi ed nature, engaging in dif-
ferent type of activities from policing to the provision of 
health and education services.2 This has resulted in the 
view that the activities of those bodies are hard to tax 
and that, in practice, it is almost impossible to establish 
a single VAT treatment applicable to all of them.3 On the 
other hand, and more importantly, there is a perception 
that  exclusion of the products supplied by public sector 
bodies from full taxation, achieves social and distribu-
tional aims. The argument is two-fold: fi rst, non-taxation 
should increase consumption of so-called merit goods; sec-
ond, non-taxation of these products is said to diminish the 
natural regressivity of consumption taxes.4
There is a high-level of support for this mixed nature 
rationale, including from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).5 Yet, if the European experience is anything 
to go by, the practice of removing supplies by public sec-
tor bodies from the tax base will most likely give rise to 
signifi cant problems.6 The rule under the EU VAT system 
is that supplies by public sector bodies are non-taxable, 
that is, they are outside the scope of VAT. In practice, 
however, the VAT treatment of public sector bodies is 
extremely complex,7 determined by the interaction of 
several different provisions of the Common VAT System 
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8 Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 Nov. 2006 on the common system of VAT, [2006] OJ L347/1.
9 See A Strategy to Improve the Operation of the VAT System within the Context of the Internal Market, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment, COM(2000) 348 fi nal, 7 Jun. 2000, at 11; and Review and Update of VAT Strategy Priorities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament, COM(2003) 614 fi nal, 20 Oct. 2003, at 11.
10 It is important to note that the wording of the provision is largely based in the civil law traditional distinction between private and public law, something which is not 
present, at least with the same emphasis, on common law countries.
11 Case 235/85, Commission v. Netherlands, [1986] ECR 1471. The Dutch Government had argued in this case that services should fall within the scope of that provision, where 
they are as regarded as acts of the public authorities, regardless of whether they are formally bodies subject to public law or not.
12 Ibid., at paras 16 and 17.
Directive (CVSD),8 and in particular Articles 13 and 132, 
and Annex I therein. Despite the acknowledged diffi cul-
ties caused by the current system, for the most part, these 
provisions have remained unaltered since their introduc-
tion in 1977. The European Commission has in the past 
expressed an intention to revise the current legislative 
framework, but so far there have been no signifi cant devel-
opments.9 In the meantime, the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) has been extremely active in this area. Undoubtedly 
as a consequence of the complex legislative framework, 
the last two decades have witnessed a steady stream of ref-
erences from national courts to the ECJ, the intensity of 
which seems to have increased over the recent years.
The aim of this paper is to consider the current leg-
islative framework, assessing in particular whether the 
Court’s intervention has been successful in dealing with 
diffi culties arising from it, or whether more radical legis-
lative reform is required. In doing so, consideration will 
be given to recent developments in this area, at both the 
legislative and jurisprudential levels, in an attempt to 
determine whether they constitute positive progress, or 
whether together they represent a slow and subtle move 
towards a further deepening of the system’s already exist-
ing fl aws.
2.  THE EU VAT TREATMENT OF PUBLIC 
SECTOR BODIES
The general rule on the VAT treatment of public sector 
bodies is set out in Article 13(1), fi rst paragraph of the 
CVSD, which establishes that public legal entities will 
be regarded as non-taxable persons, where they engage 
in activities or transactions as public authorities. In prac-
tice, this means that they will not charge any VAT on 
their supplies, but neither will they be entitled to deduct 
input VAT incurred on the supplies made to them. This 
basic rule is however subject to various exceptions, some 
of which are set out in Article 13(1) itself; others can be 
found in other provisions of the directive, namely Articles 
2(1)(b)(i), 3(2)(a) and 132 and Annex I; and others yet 
result from the inter-connection between the different par-
agraphs in Article 13 and those others provisions. Overall, 
the VAT treatment of public sector bodies is dependent 
on the answers given to two fundamental  questions: Is the 
transaction taxable or non-taxable, and, if it is taxable, is 
it exempt or not exempt?
2.1.  Public Sector Bodies:  Taxable or 
Non-taxable Persons?
The fi rst step towards establishing the VAT treatment of 
a particular activity / transaction undertaken by a pub-
lic sector body is to determine whether the public sector 
body in question is regarded as a taxable person, or a non-
taxable person, for the purposes of that activity.
2.1.1.  General Rule:  Public Sector Bodies Engaged in 
Activities or Transactions as Public  Authorities
Under the fi rst paragraph of Article 13(1) of the CVSD, 
where States, regional and local government authorities 
and other bodies governed by public law engage in activi-
ties or transactions as public authorities, they are regarded 
as non-taxable persons in respect of those activities or 
transactions, that is, those activities will be deemed to be 
outside the scope of VAT.10 Despite this apparent simplic-
ity, the application of this provision does in fact give rise 
to many complications, notably due to the fact that the 
terms used are both unclear and susceptible to different 
interpretations.
There are two key elements to the provision: the iden-
tity of the supplier, ‘bodies governed by public law’, and 
the manner in which the supply is undertaken, ‘activities 
or transactions in which they engage as public authori-
ties’. It is now settled case-law that these two elements are 
cumulative, rather than alternative. In order for activities 
to fall within the scope of the fi rst paragraph of Article 
13(1), they must be both: undertaken by a body governed 
by public law; and, engaged in by that body, acting as a 
public authority. First established by the ECJ early on, in 
Commission v. Netherlands,11 this approach has been consist-
ently reiterated in later rulings. The rationale behind it 
seems to be the exceptional nature of the regime appli-
cable to public sector bodies in general. In Commission v. 
 Netherlands, the Commission had argued that the prin-
ciple of tax on consumption, which underlines the EU 
VAT  system, required the main rule in Article 13 to be 
interpreted strictly.12 Although the Court did not state 
The EU  VAT  Treatment of Public Sector Bodies
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 explicitly that that provision should be interpreted strictly 
in that case, it did confi rm this in later judgments, such as 
Carpareto Piacentino and Rivergaro.13
In light of the cumulative nature of the two elements of 
the main rule in Article 13(1), fi rst paragraph, it is clear 
that its scope of application is dependent on the concept 
of ‘bodies governed by public law’ and the meaning of the 
expression ‘activities or transactions in which they engage 
as public authorities’. The diffi culty however lies in the 
fact that both expressions have presented national courts 
with practical problems, resulting in various preliminary 
references being made to the ECJ over the last two dec-
ades. These have in turn allowed the Court to develop sig-
nifi cant jurisprudence.
‘Bodies Governed by Public Law’
The Court has tended to defi ne ‘bodies governed by pub-
lic law’ in negative terms, that is, by establishing those 
which are not bodies governed by public law, within the 
meaning of the fi rst paragraph of Article 13(1). In this 
context, the following have been deemed by the Court to 
be excluded from the scope of that provision:
traders governed by private law (Tolls Cases);14
bodies that are not part of the public administration 
(Commission v. Netherlands); and,
bodies that carry out independent economic activities as 
part of the exercise of a liberal profession (Commission v. 
Netherlands).15
The ECJ has also ruled in Ayuntamiento de Sevilla that 
performance of acts falling within the prerogatives of the 
public authority is not suffi cient to characterize a body 
as one governed by public law. It follows that, if public 
duties are entrusted to an independent third party, those 
activities do not, in principle, fall within the scope of the 
public sector bodies’ regime.16 The strict interpretation 
of the expression ‘bodies governed by public law’ had 
therefore the obvious effect of excluding all outsourcing 
situations from the scope of the main rule in Article 13. 
–
–
–
Although such a move should not be deemed surprising, 
it gives rise to its own problems. Exclusion of outsourced 
services from the scope of the regime applicable to public 
sector bodies was not only consistent with the strict inter-
pretation approach adopted by the Court in previous rul-
ings, but arguably the most appropriate approach in light 
of the exceptional nature of that regime. Such consistency, 
however, comes at a price. As it will be discussed below, 
applying a distinct tax treatment to outsourced and non-
outsourced situations will unavoidably give rise to further 
economic distortions.
‘Activities or Transactions in Which They Engage as 
Public Authorities’
The unclear nature of the expression ‘activities or transac-
tions in which they engage as public authorities’ has given 
rise to considerable case-law and has been at the centre of 
most ECJ rulings on the regime applicable to public sector 
bodies.17 Although, in Carpareto Piacentino and Rivergaro, 
the Court ruled that it was for the national courts to deter-
mine which activities or transactions fulfi l the conditions 
set out in Article 13(1), fi rst paragraph,18 in that same 
judgment, as well as in subsequent ones, it provided some 
guidelines as regards the expression’s interpretation.
It clearly emerges from this jurisprudence that the 
main criterion for determining the scope of the expression 
‘engaging as public authorities’ is the legal regime appli-
cable under national law to the activity at issue. Public 
bodies are deemed to be engaging in activities as public 
authorities when they do so under a special legal regime, 
applicable to them, or where they make use of ‘public 
powers’. Public bodies will be excluded from the scope of 
the provision where they act under the same conditions as 
those applied to private bodies. This basic criterion, fi rst 
outlined in Carpareto Piacentino and Rivergaro,19 has been 
consistently reiterated by the Court in later rulings, such as 
Commune di Carpaneto Piacento and Others, which was issued 
some months later,20 and also in Ayuntamiento de Sevilla.21 
Further guidelines on how to apply this  criterion have 
been provided in more recent judgments and  opinions, 
Notes
13 Joint cases 231/87 and 129/88, Carpareto Piacentino and Rivergaro, [1989] ECR 3233.
14 A series of cases, dating from the late 1990s and early 2000s, concerning the VAT treatment of tolls paid as consideration for the usage of roads, motorways and bridges. 
See cases C-276/97, Commission v. France, [2000] ECR I-6251; C-358/97, Commission v. Ireland, [2000] ECR I-6301; C-359/97, Commission v. United Kingdom, [2000] ECR 
I-6355; C-408/97, Commission v. Netherlands, [2000] ECR I-6417; C-260/98, Commission v. Greece, [2000] ECR I-6537.
15 See n. 11 above, at para. 23. This previous ruling seems to be at the centre of an application from the European Commission currently pending at the ECJ concerning the 
VAT treatment of services supplied by state legal offi cers, see case C-246/08, Commission v. Finland, [2008] OJ C209/29.
16 Case C-202/90, Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, [1991] ECR I-4247, at paras 19 and 20. This approach has been reiterated recently by the Court in case C-456/07, Mihal, Order of 
21 May 2008; and again in case C-462/05, Commission v. Portugal, Judgment of 12 Jun. 2008, at paras 38-42.
17 It has also been subject of a European Parliamentary written question, see VAT exemption for bodies ‘acting as public authorities’ as defi ned in the Sixth Council Directive on VAT, 
Written Question 780/93 by Gary Titley to the Commission, [1993] OJ C288/35.
18 This approach has attracted criticism, see S. van Thiel, ‘EEC – Public Authorities as Taxable Persons for VAT’, International VAT Monitor 2 (1990): 28-34.
19 See n. 13, at paras 15 and 16.
20 Case C-4/89, Commune di Carpaneto Piacento and Others, [1990] ECR I-1869.
21 Case C-202/90, Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, [1991] ECR I-4247.
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more specifi cally it is clear that its application will not be 
dependent on the following considerations:
type, subject matter or purpose of the activity (Câmara 
Municipal do Porto);
ownership of property where activity is undertaken 
(Câmara Municipal do Porto);22
whether in fulfi lling responsibilities exclusively allo-
cated to it, the State makes use of civil law procedure 
(Advocate General Kokott in T-Mobile and Hutchison 
3G and Others); and,
whether the public body receives a high amount of 
revenue from its activity (Advocate General Kokott in 
T-Mobile and Others and Hutchison 3G and Others).23
Thus, none of these are determinant factors.
2.1.2. Exceptions
The general rule in the fi rst paragraph of Article 13(1) of 
the CVSD, according to which the activities undertaken 
by bodies governed by public law will be deemed to be 
outside the scope of VAT, where they have been engaged 
in by those bodies as public authorities, is subject to four 
exceptions.24 Three of these exceptions limit the scope of 
the main rule, establishing that even where activities fall 
within the scope of that rule, they may still be regarded as 
taxable provided certain conditions are present, as follows:
Where treating those activities as outside the scope of 
VAT would lead to signifi cant distortions of competi-
tion (Article 13(1), second paragraph);
Where certain activities are at stake, provided they are 
not carried out on such a small scale as to be negligible 
(Article 13(1), third paragraph and Annex I); and
Where the activities in question are intra-Community 
acquisitions, above a certain threshold (Articles 2(1)(b)(i) 
and 3(2)(a)).
On the contrary, the fi nal exception to the main rule 
seems to extend its scope. Where public sector bodies 
engage in activities not as public authorities, Member 
States may still regard them as falling under the scope of 
the main rule: where exempt activities, listed in certain 
articles of the CVSD (Article 13(2)), are at stake.
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
Open Clause Exception: ‘Signifi cant Distortions of 
 Competition’
Under the second paragraph of Article 13(1) the main 
rule in the fi rst paragraph of the Article will not apply 
where its application would lead to signifi cant distortion 
of competition. The clause’s objective is clearly to intro-
duce an element of fl exibility into the rigidity of the main 
rule and, as the Court itself has stated in Halle, to ensure 
 fi scal neutrality.25 In practice, however, the expression 
‘signifi cant distortions of competition’ has caused signifi -
cant  diffi culties of interpretation and application. Perhaps 
for that precise reason, the ECJ ruled earlier in Carpareto 
 Piacentino and Rivergaro, that Member States were not 
obliged to transpose the criterion literally, or to lay down 
precise quantitative limits for such treatment; they were, 
however, obliged to ensure that public bodies were treated 
as taxable in cases where the treatment as non-taxable per-
sons could lead to distortions of competition.26
The focus placed by the Court in that ruling on the 
aims of the provision, rather than on the means adopted to 
achieve those aims, has been re-emphasized in subsequent 
rulings. Recently, in Gotz, the Court ruled that Member 
States were free to defi ne the relevant geographic market 
for the purposes of applying the open clause.27 Some years 
before, in Câmara Municipal do Porto the ECJ had already 
ruled that Member States were free to defi ne in their 
national legislation activities which were liable to bring 
about distortions of competition, leaving it to administra-
tive authorities to apply the defi nition. Yet, this freedom 
did not extend to situations where a discretionary power 
has been given to an administrative authority to apply it.28 
Equally, this freedom is somewhat limited by the fact that 
in Halle the Court confi rmed that a private person, who 
is in competition with a public body and alleges that the 
latter is undertaxed, is entitled to rely in Article 13(1), 
second paragraph, before the national court, that is the 
open clause has direct effect.29
Most rulings regarding the interpretation of the second 
paragraph of Article 13(1) have therefore concentrated on 
the scope of the freedom of transposition given to Member 
States under that provision. Whilst very little has there-
fore been said about the scope of the expression  ‘signifi cant 
distortions of competition’ itself. Notable exceptions were 
the Opinions of Advocate General Kokott in T-Mobile and 
Others and Hutchison 3G and Others, and that of Advocate 
Notes
22 Case C-446/98, Câmara Municipal do Porto, [2000] ECR I-11435, at para. 22.
23 Cases C-284/04, T-Mobile and Others, [2007] ECR I-5189 and C-369/04, Hutchison 3G and Others, [2007] ECR I-5247, respectively, Opinion of the Advocate General, at para. 124.
24 The suggestion that Art. 13 of the CVSD was divided into main rule and exceptions was also put forward by Advocate General Mischo in joint cases 231/87 and 129/88, 
Carpareto Piacentino and Rivergaro, [1989] ECR 3233.
25 Case C-430/04, Halle, [2006] ECR I-4999, at para. 24.
26 See n. 13 above, at para. 24. A similar interpretation was adopted in Comune di Carpaneto Piacentino and Others, n. 20 above, at para. 13.
27 Case C-408/06, Gotz, Judgment of 13 Dec. 2007, nyr, at para. 46.
28 See n. 22 above, at para. 34.
29 See n. 21 above, at para. 32.
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General Maduro in Isle of Wight and Others. In T-Mobile 
and Others and Hutchison 3G and Others, Advocate General 
Kokott started by commenting on timing issues, noting 
that the effect on competition must, in principle, exist 
at the date of the transaction.30 On the basis of previous 
ECJ jurisprudence, namely Assurandor-Societetet, a case 
concerning the application of exemptions,31 she seemed to 
acknowledge that the open clause in Article 13(1) could 
include within its scope distortions of competition, which 
the treating public sector bodies as non-taxable persons 
might give rise to in the future. However, she emphasized 
that, ‘the risk of distortions of competition must be real’.32 
Although the risk of distortions of competition can be 
real even if no competitor is at present offering competing 
supplies subject to VAT, real risk is ruled out where there 
are no potential competitors due to the existing legislative 
framework.
The recent decision of the Grand Chamber in Isle of 
Wight and Others, which follows the previous Opinion of 
Advocate General Maduro, takes this approach further. 
The Court in this case was asked by the UK courts to 
decide, fi rst on whether any distortion of competition is to 
be assessed at a local level, which requires the conditions 
of competition on the relevant market to be established, or 
whether it must be assessed solely in the light of the activ-
ity concerned, and secondly to clarify the meaning of the 
expressions ‘would lead to’ and ‘signifi cant’, for the pur-
poses of the second paragraph of Article 13(1). On the fi rst 
point, Court emphasized the point made in previous rul-
ings that the clause is to be interpreted as meaning that it 
is incumbent upon the Member States, within the frame-
work of the discretion that is accorded to them for imple-
mentation of that provision, to determine on the basis of 
the activities concerned whether there would be a risk of 
distortion of competition. In this regard, the meaning of 
the expression signifi cant distortions to competition ‘must 
be evaluated by reference to the activity in question, as 
such, without such evaluation relating to any local market 
in particular’.33 More importantly, on the second point, the 
ECJ provided some clarifi cation on the meaning of some 
of the expressions used within the clause: on the meaning 
of the words ‘would lead to’, it considered that they must 
be understood as including both actual  competition and 
potential competition in so far as the  possibility of the 
 latter is real and not hypothetical; as regards the expres-
sion ‘signifi cant’, it contended that although it does not 
imply that the distortion of competition is trivial or excep-
tional, rather that it is out of the ordinary, the interpreta-
tion of the concept fell ultimately within the discretion of 
the Member States, so far as the interpretation complies 
with the objectives of the Directive.34
Further guidance is likely to come soon, with two cases 
currently pending before the ECJ, concerning the interpre-
tation of this clause. In Salix, a case referred in March 2008 
by the German courts, the Court has been asked whether 
‘signifi cant distortions of competition’, within the meaning 
of the open clause, only exists where treatment of a body 
governed by public law as a non-taxable person would lead 
to signifi cant distortions of competition to the detriment of 
competing private taxable persons, or also, where treatment 
of a body governed by public law as a non-taxable person 
would lead to signifi cant distortions to its detriment.35
Certain Activities or Transactions where not 
‘Negligible’
Under the third paragraph of Article 13(1), where  public 
sector bodies engage in the activities listed in Annex I 
to the CVSD, they will be regarded as taxable  persons, 
unless such activities are carried out on a negligible 
scale.36  Similarly to the main rule in the fi rst paragraph 
of  Article 13(1), the application of this exception appears 
to be dependent on the establishment of two cumulative 
elements: fi rst, whether the activities at stake fall within 
the scope of those listed in Annex I; second, whether they 
are not being carried out on such a small scale as to be 
considered negligible. This, however, does not seem to be 
the Court’s understanding.
It is true that in Câmara Municipal do Porto the Court 
concluded that both elements had to be present in order 
for the exception to apply.37 The question in that case how-
ever was whether the third subparagraph of Article 13(1) 
should be interpreted as meaning that bodies governed by 
public law are always regarded as taxable persons in respect 
of their non-negligible activities, or whether the criterion 
of the negligible scale of those activities applied only to 
the activities listed in Annex I. A different approach has 
been taken by the ECJ as regards the need to transpose 
Notes
30 See n. 23 above, Opinion of the Advocate General, at paras 128 and 127, respectively.
31 Case C-8/01, Assurandor-Societetet, [2003] ECR I-13711.
32 See n. 30 above, Opinion of the Advocate General, at para. 130.
33 Case C-288/07, Isle of Wight and Others, Judgment of 16 Sep. 1008, nyr, at para. 53.
34 Ibid., at paras 65 and 79.
35 Case C-102/08, Salix, [2008] OJ C142/12.
36 Annex I lists the following activities: telecommunications services; supply of water, gas, electricity and thermal energy; transport of goods; port and airport services; pas-
senger transport; supply of new goods manufactured for sale; transactions in respect of agricultural products, carried out by agricultural intervention agencies pursuant to 
Regulations on the common organization of the market in those products; organization of trade fairs and exhibitions; warehousing; activities of commercial publicity bodies; 
activities of travel agents; running of staff shops, cooperatives and industrial canteens and similar institutions; and, activities carried out by radio and television bodies.
37 See n. 22 above, at para. 28.
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the non-negligible criterion. In Carpareto  Piacentino and 
Rivergaro, the ECJ stated that:
Having regard to the structure of the provision in ques-
tion, it must be interpreted as meaning that the Mem-
ber States are free to exclude from the scope of such 
compulsory treatment the activities listed in [Annex I] 
in so far as they are carried out on a negligible scale, 
but are not required to do so. Consequently, they are 
also not required to fi x a ceiling for treatment as non-
 taxable persons in respect of the activities at issue.38
A similar approach was taken by the ECJ in Commune di 
Carpaneto Piacento and Others,39 and by Advocate General 
Kokott in T-Mobile and Others.40 Thus it seems that the 
essential element of the non-negligible clause is actually 
the fi rst element – the activities at stake must fall within 
the scope of those listed in Annex I – whereas the transposi-
tion of the second element is optional. Perhaps as a result 
of this optionality, the Court has never ruled on the mean-
ing of negligible for the purposes of that provision. On the 
contrary, as regards the fi rst essential element, the Court 
has had a limited number of opportunities to rule on the 
interpretation of any of the activities listed in Annex I, all 
of which within the last few years. From the jurisprudence 
regarding the interpretation of the different activities listed 
in Annex I the following emerges:
the expression ‘telecommunications’ in point 1, should 
be construed in its narrower sense and consequently, 
does not include the allocation by the State of fre-
quency use rights to supply mobile communications 
services (Advocate General Kokott in T-Mobile and Oth-
ers and Hutchison 3G and Others);41
milk quotas sales points cannot be regarded either as a 
‘transaction in respect of agricultural products’, within 
the meaning of point 7, or a ‘staff shop’, within the 
meaning of point 12 (Gotz);42
laying mains connections forms part of a supply of 
water, for the purposes of point 2 (Zweckvenband).43
Equally, it now seems settled case-law that in the 
absence of defi nitions of the activities listed in Annex I, 
the ECJ will take into account, when interpreting those 
provisions, not only their wording, but also the context in 
which they were approved and the objective pursued by 
–
–
–
the rules,44 that is, the Court will engage in both histori-
cal and teleological interpretations when considering the 
activities listed in Annex I.
Intra-Community Acquisitions above the Threshold
Article 2(1)(b)(i) of the CVSD read in conjunction 
with Article 3(1)(b), (2)(a) and (b), and (3) of the same 
 Directive, mean that intra-Community acquisitions by 
public sector bodies will not be subject to VAT if they are 
below the EUR 10,000 threshold, unless the body opts 
otherwise. However, once that threshold is exceeded, or 
if it has been exceeded in the previous calendar year, all 
intra- Community acquisitions will be taxable. The ECJ 
has until now, never been called upon to interpret these 
provisions.
Exempt Activities Clause
Under Article 13(2) of the CVSD, where public sector bod-
ies engage in exempt activities, listed in certain  articles 
of the CVSD, as not being as public authorities, Member 
States may still regard them as falling under the scope of 
the main rule, and thus non-taxable for the purposes of 
those activities. This exception to the fi rst paragraph of 
Article 13(1), extending its scope, is based on a complex 
inter-connection between this Article and provisions on 
exemptions. One of the questions it raises concerns the 
scope of the optionality granted therein to the Member 
States. This has been the subject of a recent reference to 
the ECJ. In Salix, the German courts have asked the Court 
whether Member States may treat activities of States, 
regional and local authorities and other bodies governed 
by public law, which are exempt, as activities in which 
they engage as public authorities, only where the Member 
States make express legal provision to that effect.45
Although this exception to the main rule was already 
present in the original version of the Sixth VAT Direc-
tive, its wording has been changed slightly post-recast.46 
Under the original version, the then fourth paragraph of 
Article 4(5) referred exclusively to exempt activities under 
what are now Articles 132, 135, 136 and 371, 374 to 377, 
378(2) and 379(2). Yet, the current provision refers to var-
ious other exemptions, which had not been previously set 
out within those Articles, but rather in the various Acts of 
Notes
38 See n. 13 above, at para. 27.
39 See n. 20 above, at para. 27.
40 See n. 23 above, at para. 102.
41 See n. 23 above, Opinion of the Advocate General, at paras 84 et seq.
42 See n. 27 above, at para. 33.
43 Case C-442/05, Zweckvenband, Judgment of Apr. 2008, nyr, at para. 44.
44 See n. 43 above, at para. 30 and n. 41 above, Opinion of the Advocate General, at paras 84 et seq.
45 Case C-102/08, Salix, [2008]  OJ C142/12.
46 Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 12 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes – Common system of VAT: uniform 
basis of assessment, [1977] OJ L145/1.
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Accession. This broadening of the scope of the exception 
should be seen in the context of previous jurisprudence on 
the matter.
In 1995 the ECJ was called upon to interpret Article 
13(2), in its original version, in Marktgemeinde Welden,47 a case 
concerning a German municipality engaging in the letting 
of immovable property. In essence, the question asked to 
the Court was whether exempt activities in respect of which 
it is possible to opt to be taxed, such as letting of immov-
able property, fell within the scope of Article 13(2), in par-
ticular where these activities are pursued under the same 
legal conditions, and in the same way, as private traders.
In a written submission to the Court, the Commission 
defended the adoption of a strict interpretation of Arti-
cle 13(2). It argued that, as a provision derogating from 
the basic system introduced by the Directive, it should 
be strictly interpreted and thus applied to the activities 
exempted under Articles 132, 135 and 136 only insofar 
as they were expressly associated with bodies governed by 
public law. Activities, such as the letting of buildings, 
did not satisfy that criterion. The Court, however, disa-
greed. It considered that Article 13(2) did not distinguish 
between the several activities included in those Articles, 
and thus without further reasoning, concluded that:
Member States are authorised to exclude from treat-
ment as taxable persons bodies governed by public law 
which carry out activities exempted under Article 13 
of the directive, even if they are performed in a similar 
manner to those of a private trader.48
This approach was reiterated by the ECJ a few years 
later, in Câmara Municipal do Porto.49 However, even in the 
absence of the Court’s case-law, a strict interpretation of 
Article 13(1), as suggested by the Commission in Markt-
gemeinde Welden, would in any event probably be contrary 
to the new wording of the provision. The legislator’s refer-
ence, under the new wording, to various Articles which do 
not include any exemptions specifi cally directed at bodies 
governed by public law, is in itself a clear indication that 
the scope of the provision is not limited to those exemp-
tions that do.
In light of the above, the fundamental question is 
 therefore what are the legal implications of the clause 
in Article 13(2), in particular under its new wording? 
First, it clearly follows from that clause that Member 
States may, in principle, treat any of the exempt activities 
listed as non-taxable, or outside the scope of VAT, where 
performed by bodies governed by public law. Arguably, 
however, this entitlement is subject to two restrictions: 
the clause will not apply where treating these activities 
as outside the scope of VAT gives rise to signifi cant dis-
tortions of competition (Article 13(1), second paragraph); 
and where performance of exempt activities entails supply 
of goods or services listed in Annex I, these supplies will 
be taxable unless done on a negligible scale (Article 13(1), 
third paragraph). Although the ECJ has not yet ruled on 
the inter-connection between Article 13(2) and the other 
clauses in Article 13, this seems to be the most reasonable 
interpretation in light of the wording of those provisions.
Second, the exempt activities clause in Article 13(2), 
particularly in its new wording, will potentially result in 
further erosion of the tax base. It is true that, insofar as the 
tax base is concerned, it is irrelevant whether activities are 
exempt or outside the scope of VAT, as in both cases they 
will be excluded from the tax base. The rationale behind 
this clause seems to be that the activities falling within 
its scope would have been prima facie excluded from 
the tax base, on the basis of the exemptions’ provisions; 
thus their treatment as outside the scope of VAT would 
have no additional effect on the tax base. This however 
rests on the assumption that all exemptions at stake will 
apply regardless of the identity of the supplier, something 
which, despite the Commission’s recent remarks,50 appears 
far from clear. On the one hand, as the Commission itself 
pointed out in Marktgemeinde Welden, differences in the 
wording of the exemptions seem to suggest that some are 
only applicable when supplied by a particular body. On 
the other hand, the principle of strict interpretation of 
exemptions, as developed by the ECJ, has resulted in some 
exemptions being, either de jure, or de facto, only appli-
cable where the activities are undertaken by a specifi c type 
of supplier.51
Finally, the Court’s rulings in Marktgemeinde Welden 
and Câmara Municipal do Porto, and the new wording of 
Article 13(2) post-recast, raise the question of whether 
the reference in various exemptions to ‘bodies governed 
by public law’ should be deemed redundant. If Member 
States can deem all exemptions to be outside the scope of 
VAT, regardless of the wording of the exemptions’ provi-
sions, then the references to ‘bodies governed by public 
law’ within some of those would seem to have little legal 
meaning. This will be true for the most part. However, 
Notes
47 Case C-247/95, Marktgemeinde Welden, [1997] ECR I-779.
48 Ibid., at para. 20.
49 See n. 22 above, at paras 40 to 46.
50 See Consultation Paper on Modernising Value Added Tax Obligations for Financial Services and Insurances (2006), at 9.
51 For examples of the fi rst type, see cases C-401/05, VDP Dental Laboratory, [2006] ECR I-12121, on the interpretation of the exemption applicable to dental services 
(Art. 132(1)(e) of the CVSD), and C-453/93, W. Bulthuis-Griffi oen, [1995] ECR I-2341, on the interpretation of the exemption applicable to welfare and social security work 
(Art. 132(1)(g) of the CVSD). For an example of the second type, see case C-472/03, Arthur Andersen, [2005] ECR I-1719, on the interpretation of the insurance exemption 
(Art. 135(1)(a) of the CVSD). On the case-law on insurance transactions, see also R. de la Feria, ‘The EU VAT Treatment of Insurance and Financial Services (Again) under 
Review’, EC Tax Review 2 (2007): 74-89.
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there are two circumstances within which reference to 
‘bodies governed by public law’ might remain relevant. 
As regards activities which fall within the scope of exemp-
tions that do not refer specifi cally to public bodies, Mem-
ber States may opt to deem those activities as outside the 
scope of VAT, but they would not have been necessarily 
regarded as exempt, under ECJ case-law. However, as 
regards activities which fall within the scope of exemp-
tions that do refer specifi cally to public bodies, they will 
always be deemed exempt, thus removing the optional-
ity element. In addition, where Member States avail of 
the option provided for in Article 13(2), classifi cation of 
the activities as outside the scope of VAT will be subject 
to the exceptional clauses in the second and third para-
graph of Article 13(1). Such control will not be present as 
regards exemptions: where activities undertaken by public 
bodies fall within the scope of one of the exemptions, they 
will be deemed exempt, regardless of whether exempting 
those activities gives rise to signifi cant distortions of com-
petition, or whether they include the supply of specifi c 
goods or services.52
2.2.  Public Sector Bodies:  Exempt 
or Non-exempt
As clearly results from the above discussion, even where 
a public sector body is deemed to be a taxable person 
under Article 13 and Annex I to the CVSD, the  activities / 
 transactions in which they engage, although subject to 
VAT, might not necessarily be taxable. Having determined 
the taxable status of a particular public sector body, the 
second step in order to determine the VAT treatment of its 
activities is to establish whether those activities are listed 
in any of the exemptions’ provisions in the CVSD, in par-
ticular those listed in Article 132 therein. In this regard, 
the guidance provided by the ECJ is equally fundamental 
and can be divided into two components: jurisprudence 
regarding the application of exemptions to public sector 
bodies, specifi cally; and case-law regarding the interpreta-
tion of exemptions in general.
2.2.1.  Exemptions  Applicable to the  Activities 
of  Public Sector Bodies
For the reasons set out above, it is unclear whether all 
exemptions could potentially apply to activities  undertaken 
by public sector bodies, or merely the ones listed in  Article 
132, which refer specifi cally to the public nature of the 
supplier.53 Unfortunately, there is no jurisprudential guid-
ance on this matter.
Despite the vast case-law regarding exemptions,54 
hitherto the ECJ has never been asked whether specifi c 
activities of a public sector body should fall within the 
scope of any of the exemptions in the CVSD, which did 
not make reference to ‘public’ bodies in their wording. 
In fact, the number of ECJ cases concerning the inter-
pretation of exemptions’ provisions and involving public 
sector bodies is, relatively speaking, small, with only fi ve 
cases reported to date,55 although further growth is envis-
aged.56 In all of these cases the aim was to include certain 
activities within the scope of the exemptions: in one case, 
the activities of a public body itself were at stake;57 in all 
others, the public activities concerned were undertaken 
by either an intermediary, or a subcontractor, on behalf 
of the public body. The Court’s initial approach to these 
situations, as refl ected in Commission v. Germany, was to 
refuse the inclusion of the activities under consideration 
within the scope of the exemption, on the basis of a strict 
interpretation of the provisions.58 In more recent cases, 
namely Stichting Kinderopvang Enschede and Horizon College, 
the Court has adopted a more nuanced approach, refusing 
prima facie the extension of the scope of the exemption, 
but allowing the exceptional inclusion of intermediary 
Notes
52 Except, of course, in two situations: fi rst, where the exemption itself limits its own scope to situations which do not cause distortions of competition, as in the case of 
Art. 132(1)(f), or Art. 132(1)(l) of the CVSD, see the Court’s approach to the relevance of this limitation in case C-8/01, Assurandor-Societetet, [2003] ECR I-13711;  second, 
where the Member States themselves impose the restriction that exemptions will not be granted where they will be likely to cause distortions of competition, under 
Art. 133(d) of the CVSD.
53 These are: the supply by the public postal services (Art. 132(1)(a)); hospital and medical care and closely related activities undertaken by bodies governed by public law 
(Art. 132(1)(b)); the supply of services and of goods closely linked to welfare and social security work, including those supplied by old people’s homes, by bodies gov-
erned by public law (Art. 132(1)(g)); the supply of services and goods closely linked to the protection of children and young persons by bodies governed by public law 
(Art. 132(1)(h)); children’s or young people’s education, school or university education, vocational training or retraining, including the supply of services and goods closely 
related thereto, provided by bodies governed by public law (Art. 132(1)(i)); certain cultural services and goods closely linked thereto supplied by bodies governed by public 
law (Art. 132(1)(n)); and activities of public radio and television bodies other than those of commercial nature (Art. 132(1)(q)).
54 For a comprehensive review of the ECJ case-law on exemptions, see R. Laires, Apontamentos sobre a Jurisprudência Comunitária em Matéria de Isenções do IVA (Lisboa: Almedina, 
2006). One of the exemptions which has given rise to more case-law is the one applicable to medical services (Art. 132(1)(a)). For a comprehensive analysis of that case-
law, including of many of the rulings mentioned in Section 2.2.2, see J. Swinkels, ‘VAT Exemption for Medical Care’, International VAT Monitor 1 (2006): 14-18; see also, 
G. Morse, ‘Separate or Composite Supplies for VAT: Assessing the Level of Generality: Dr. Beynon and Partners v. Customs & Excise Commissioners’, British Tax Review 2 (2005): 
190-196.
55 Cases 107/84, Commission v. Germany, [1985] ECR 2655, regarding the interpretation of the exemption applicable to postal services (Art. 132(1)(a)); C-287/00, Commission 
v. Germany, [2002] ECR I-5811, regarding the interpretation of the exemption applicable to education services (Art. 132(1)(i)); C-415/04, Stichting Kinderopvang Enschede, 
[2006] ECR I-1385, regarding the interpretation of the exemptions applicable to welfare and social security work, and protection of children (Art. 132(1)(g) and (h)); 
C-434/05, Horizon College, [2007] I-4793 and C-445/05, Haderer, [2007] I-4841, both regarding the interpretation of the exemption applicable to education services 
(Art. 132(1)(i)).
56 See case C-357/07, TNT Post UK, [2007] OJ C247/12, regarding the interpretation of the exemption applicable to postal services (Art. 132(1)(a)).
57 Case C-287/00, Commission v. Germany, [2002] ECR I-5811.
58 Case 107/84, Commission v. Germany, [1985] ECR 2655.
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or subcontracted services, when certain conditions were 
 fulfi lled, in particular:
where the service is of such a nature or quality that it 
could not be assured of obtaining a service of the same 
value without the assistance of an intermediary or sub-
contracted service; and
the basic purpose of the intermediary or subcontracted 
services is not to obtain additional income for the serv-
ice provider by carrying out transactions which are in 
direct competition with those of commercial enter-
prises liable for VAT.59
Various signifi cant points emerge from these rulings. 
Firstly, it is clear, in light of the lack of jurisprudence 
relating to activities of public sector bodies in the con-
text of exemptions not listed in Article 132, as well as 
the nature of the services listed in Article 132 as ‘exemp-
tions applicable to certain activities in the public interest’, 
that regardless of the legal position adopted, in practice 
the assessment as to whether the activities of public bodies 
are, or are not, exempt, will in most cases be centred on 
the interpretation of the exemptions listed in Article 132 
in general, and on those where the legislator already makes 
specifi c reference to the public nature of the supplier, in 
particular.60 Secondly, it is equally clear that outsourcing 
or subcontracting of activities by public sector bodies is 
now common practice and that this practice gives rise to 
diffi culties, in particular in terms of the interpretation of 
the exemptions’ provisions and the inherent limitation to 
the right to deduct any VAT charged.61 Third, it is inter-
esting to note the increasing number of cases concerning 
the interpretation of exemptions in the context of cases 
involving public sector bodies: of the fi ve cases signalled 
here, only one dates back to prior to the year 2002. This 
surge is likely to denote increased interpretative diffi cul-
ties in light of new economic practices.62
–
–
2.2.2.  Interpretative  Principles  Applicable 
to  All  Exemptions
When assessing whether a specifi c activity undertaken 
by a public sector body is exempt or not, consideration 
should also be given to general interpretative principles 
developed by the Court and applicable to all exemptions. 
In particular, three principles are worth noting, namely 
the principle of strict interpretation of exemptions, the 
principle of contextual interpretation of exemptions, and 
the principle of uniform interpretation of exemptions.
The principle of strict interpretation is probably the 
one which is most often used by the Court when inter-
preting exemptions. In fact, the Court has consistently 
held that ‘the exemptions provided for in (Article 132, 
135 and 136 of the CVSD) are to be interpreted strictly 
since they constitute exceptions to the general principle 
that turnover tax is to be levied on all services supplied for 
consideration by a taxable person’.63 The Court’s prefer-
ence for a strict interpretation of exemptions has mani-
fested itself both as regards the services providers, and the 
type of services which may be exempt. Yet, it is important 
to note that the Court has sometimes departed from this 
strict interpretation,64 in particular in more recent cases, 
often to ensure respect of the principle of fi scal neutrality 
and of its corollary, the principle of VAT uniformity, or 
of equal treatment, which precludes similar goods from 
being treated differently for VAT purposes.65
On the application of the principle of contextual 
 interpretation to exemptions, the Court has stated that 
‘exemptions constitute independent concepts of Com-
munity law which must be placed in the general context 
of the common system of VAT introduced by the Sixth 
Directive’.66 Thus, exemptions are to be interpreted not 
only by reference to the context and the purpose of the 
rules of which they form part, but equally taking into con-
sideration the intention of the legislator at the time when 
the rules were introduced in 1977.67
Notes
59 Cases C-415/04, Stichting Kinderopvang Enschede, [2006] ECR I-1385 and C-434/05, Horizon College, [2007] I-4793.
60 This is, of course, not to say that situations could not be easily envisaged where activities of public sector bodies fell within the scope of other exemptions, see for example 
the exemption regarding activities concerning immovable property, Art. 135(1)(j),(k) and (l) of the CVSD.
61 On the legal and economic diffi culties created by exemptions, see Section 3.
62 See also Section 3.
63 Case C-453/93, W. Bulthuis-Griffi oen, [1995] ECR I-2341, at para. 19. See also, for other cases where the Court adopted a strict interpretation of exemptions: case 253/85, 
Commission v. United Kingdom, [1988] ECR 817; case 122/87, Commission v. Italy, [1988] ECR 2685; C-212/01, Unterpertinger, [2003] ECR I-13859, all of which regarding 
the interpretation of the exemption applicable to medical services (Art. 132(1)(b)); C-149/97, Institute of Motor Industry, [1998] ECR I-7053, regarding the interpretation 
of the exemption applicable to trade unions (Art. 132(1)(l)); and C-150/99, Stockholm Lindopark, [2001] ECR I-493, on the interpretation of the exemption applicable to 
sport organizations (Art. 132(1)(m)).
64 See, amongst others, cases C-76/99, Commission v. France, [2001] I-249; C-307/01, d’Ambrumenil, [2003] ECR I-13989; and C-106/05, L.u.p., [2006] ECR I-5123, all of 
which regarding the interpretation of the exemption applicable to medical services (Art. 132(1)(b)); C-216/97, Gregg, [1999] ECR I-4947, on the interpretation of the 
exemptions applicable to medical services and that applicable to welfare and social work (Art. 132(1)(b) and (g)); C-124/96, Commission v. Spain, [1998] ECR I-2501; 
C-174/00, Krennemer Golf, [2002] ECR I-3293, both on the interpretation of the exemption applicable to sport organizations; and C-144/00, Hoffman, [2003] ECR I-2921, 
regarding the interpretation of the exemption applicable to cultural services (Art. 132(1)(n)).
65 As C. Amand points out, the recurrent struggle between the principles of strict interpretation and fi scal neutrality is highlighted in the Court’s rather distinct approaches to 
W. Bulthuis-Griffi oen and Gregg, see ‘VAT for Public Entities and Charities – Should the Sixth Directive Be Renegotiated?’, International VAT Monitor 6 (2006): 433-443, at 437.
66 C-141/00, Kluger, [2002] ECR I-6833, on the interpretation of the exemptions applicable to medical services and that applicable to welfare and social work (Art. 132(1)(b) 
and (g)). See also C-384/98, D., [2000] ECR I-6795, regarding the interpretation of the exemption applicable to medical services (Art. 132(1)(b)).
67 See n. 50 above, at 10.
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Finally, as regards the uniform interpretation of exemp-
tions, the ECJ has stated that ‘exemptions constitute 
independent concepts of Community law whose purpose 
is to avoid divergences in the application of the VAT sys-
tem from one Member State to another’.68 Yet, as with the 
principle of strict interpretation, it is noteworthy, than on 
occasion the Court has adopted a more nuanced approach 
to the principle of uniform interpretation. In the recent 
Solleveld ruling the Court stated that Article 132(1)(c) of 
the CVSD must be interpreted as conferring on Member 
States ‘the discretion to defi ne the paramedical professions 
and the medical care coming within the scope of such pro-
fessions for the purpose of the exemption laid down by that 
provision’, so long as, in the exercise of that discretion, 
 Member States ‘comply with the objective pursued by the 
said  provision […] and the principle of fi scal neutrality’.69
It follows from the above that, in addition to the three 
interpretative principles already highlighted, when inter-
preting exemptions the Court often makes reference to the 
general VAT principle of fi scal neutrality. The Commis-
sion has even gone so far as to state that the rule according 
to which ‘the interpretation [of exemptions] must meet 
the requirements of the principle of fi scal neutrality on 
which the entire systems of VAT is based’, is one of only 
three ECJ jurisprudential pillars on exemptions.70 Whilst 
this is certainly true,71 it is equally worth noting that the 
Court itself has limited the applicability of the principle 
of fi scal neutrality, insofar as the insurance services exemp-
tion is concerned.72 This is because, as discussed below, 
the existence of exemptions is itself a contravention of the 
principle of fi scal neutrality.73
The following diagram is an attempt at summarizing 
the current VAT treatment of public sector bodies, as 
described above.
3.  LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 
OF THE CURRENT EU VAT TREATMENT 
OF PUBLIC SECTOR BODIES
The current VAT treatment of public sector bodies gives 
rise to serious consequences, at both legal and economic 
levels.74 From a legal perspective the current regime gives 
rise to defi nitional and interpretative problems, creates 
diffi culties in calculating the portion of deductible VAT, 
constitutes an incentive to engage in aggressive tax plan-
ning, and has the additional problem of being conceptual 
incoherent with the general principles of the EU VAT 
system. From an economic perspective, the restrictions to 
the deduction of input tax, which are the consequence 
of the current regime, have also resulted in considerable 
distortions. In addition, there is no defi nite economic evi-
dence that exclusion of the products supplied by public 
sector bodies from full taxation, achieves the social and 
distributional aims that are often pointed out as the main 
reason for their current EU treatment.
3.1. Legal Consequences
Defi nitional and Interpretative Problems
As the above case-law analysis demonstrates, the legal 
 provisions determining the current VAT treatment of 
public sector bodies, in particular Articles 13 and 132 
and Annex I to the CVSD, are unclear and thus suscep-
tible to differing interpretations and applications. In the 
last thirty years the ECJ has struggled with the meaning 
of expressions such as ‘engaged in as public authorities’ 
(Article 13(1), fi rst paragraph), ‘signifi cant distortions 
to competition’ (Article 13(1), second paragraph), and 
with the determination of the scope of exemptions (Arti-
cle 132(1)). Yet, the steady increase in references from 
national courts to the ECJ, focusing on the interpretation 
of these provisions, is signifi cant, and is also symptomatic 
of two facts. First, it refl ects the outdated nature of the 
existing  provisions. These are unable to deal with a new 
economic environment, where competition between pub-
lic and private bodies is common occurrence,75 and the 
pressure to increase effi ciency in the provision of public 
services has witnessed increased resort to subcontracting 
and outsourcing. Second, it relays the Court’s inability, 
despite its thirty year struggle, to resolve the inherent 
problems of the existing VAT treatment of public sector 
bodies’ activities, leading to a climate of legal uncertainty 
whereby, both these bodies and tax administrations alike, 
Notes
68 Joint cases C-394/04 and C-395/04, Ygeia, [2005] ECR I-10373, regarding the interpretation of the exemption applicable to medical services (Art. 132(1)(b)), at para. 
15. See also cases 348/87, Stiching Uitvoering Financiële Acties, [1989] ECR 1737, on the interpretation of the exemption applicable to independent groups of people 
(Art. 132(1)(f)); and C-498/03, Kingscrest Associates and Montecello, [2005] ECR I-4427, regarding the interpretation of the exemption applicable to welfare and social work 
(Art. 132(1)(g)).
69 Case C-443/04, Solleveld, [2006] ECR I-3617, at para. 51.
70 See n. 50 above, at 10.
71 See cases C-216/97, Gregg, [1999] ECR I-4947, at para. 19; C-141/00, Kluger, [2002] ECR I-6833, at para. 29; and C-45/01, Dornier, [2003] ECR I-12911, the interpreta-
tion of the exemption applicable to medical services (Art. 132(1)(b)), at para. 42.
72 Case C-8/01, Assurandor-Societetet, [2003] ECR I-13711, at para. 75.
73 See Section 3.1.
74 Many of these diffi culties are common to those faced by charities and other non-governmental organizations, see J. Warburton, ‘Charities and Business: A VAT Conundrum’, 
British Tax Review 1 (2007): 73 et seq.
75 See S.D. Coleclough, ‘The Sixth VAT Directive and the Need for Reform’, British Tax Review 4 (1995): 378-384, at 380.
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are increasingly unsure as to whether a specifi c activity is 
outside the scope of VAT, is exempt, or is taxable.76 This 
uncertainty in turn had the effect of increasing compliance 
and administrative costs, as more time and resources will 
be devoted to establishing the correct VAT treatment of 
each activity undertaken by that public sector body.
Calculation of Recoverable Input VAT and 
 Apportionment of Tax
One of the most obvious legal consequences of the existing 
VAT treatment of public sector bodies is the fact that it 
gives rise to apportionment of input tax situations. Fully 
outside the scope, or exempt, public bodies are probably 
a rarity. More common will be the situation whereby one 
particular body has a mixed VAT nature, engaging in 
activities which are at the same time outside the scope, 
exempt, and taxable. This means in practice that most 
bodies will be able to deduct at least part of their input 
VAT, under Articles 173 to 175 of the CVSD. The dif-
fi culties reside in the fact that calculation of deductible 
VAT, as prescribed in those provisions, is itself problem-
atic, and has given rise to considerable case-law.77
Although a comprehensive analysis of the different 
methods of apportioning input VAT is outside the scope 
of this article, it is worth noting that there are essentially 
two methods of determining the proportion of deductible 
input VAT, namely direct allocation and pro-rata. Member 
States can use either of these methods, or a combination 
of both, and in this respect they display signifi cant dis-
crepancies.78 However, whichever the preferred method, 
the process tends to be complex, as with the defi nitional 
and interpretative problems highlighted above, thereby 
entailing high administrative and compliance costs. As 
the Commission itself has recently acknowledged:
This process generates considerable administrative 
charges for economic operators and fi scal authorities 
and is a continuous source of litigation, creating an 
atmosphere which reduces the level of legal certainty 
for businesses and increases budgetary insecurity for 
Member States.79
Planning and Aggressive Planning
For any partially exempt or non-taxable legal person, 
faced with the reality of non-deductibility of all their 
input VAT, there are two basic methods of curtailing VAT 
costs: minimizing VAT input, by acquiring less goods 
and/or services, which are subject to VAT; and maximiz-
ing VAT output, by increasing the number of taxable sup-
plies and, thus, the overall percentage of deductible input 
VAT. Whilst the legitimacy of engaging in VAT planning 
has been acknowledged by the ECJ in joint cases Gemeente 
Leusden and Holin Groep,80 non-tax reasons will often pre-
vent legal persons from adopting measures, which will 
refl ect either of these methods. It is in this context that 
so-called aggressive VAT planning, or VAT avoidance, 
schemes, will often emerge.81 In fact, two recent cases, 
University of Huddersfi eld and Centralan, have demonstrated 
how VAT costs, resulting from the exclusion of the right 
to deduct input tax, can act as a catalyst for public bod-
ies in general, and universities in particular, to engage in 
aggressive VAT planning.82
Conceptual Incoherences
From a conceptual perspective, the current VAT treatment 
of public sector bodies is also defective. By treating these 
bodies as de facto fi nal consumers, in respect of many of 
their activities, the current regime is arguably contrary 
to the principle of VAT as a tax on consumption,83 which 
constitutes one of the fundamental principles of the EU 
VAT system.84 Not only should fi nal consumers be, by 
nature, physical persons,85 but equally the treatment 
as fi nal consumers of public bodies does not accurately 
refl ect practice, as goods and services supplied to those 
bodies will unavoidably be used as inputs to the activi-
ties, in which they are engaged. Furthermore, the cur-
rent regime applicable to public sector bodies  inherently 
contravenes the principle of fi scal neutrality, as set out 
in Article 1 of the CVSD and developed by the ECJ – 
another fundamental principle of the EU VAT system. As 
Advocate General Jacobs so clearly stated in Waterschap 
Notes
76 This climate of legal uncertainty resulting from the case-law is also refl ected in Member States’ discrepant transposition of the provisions in Art. 13 of the CVSD into 
domestic legislation, see interesting account provided by O. Jimenez, ‘VAT and Public Bodies in EC Member States’, Intertax 36, nos 6/7 (2008): 268-281.
77 See in particular landmark case C-98/98, Midland Bank, [2000] ECR I-4177.
78 See general overview provided by C. Amand, n. 65 above, at 434. See also, H. Huzinga, ‘Financial Services VAT – VAT in Europe?’, Economic Policy October (2002): 499-534, 
at 501.
79 See n. 50 above, at 7.
80 Joint cases C-487/01 Gemeente Leusden, and C-7/02, Holin Groep, [2004] ECR I-5337.
81 For an analysis of the meaning and catalysts for aggressive VAT planning, see R. de la Feria, ‘The European Court of Justice’s Solution to Aggressive VAT Planning – Further 
towards Legal Uncertainty?’, EC Tax Review 1 (2006): 27-35.
82 Cases C-223/03, University of Huddersfi eld, [2006] ECR I-1751 and C-63/04, Centralan, [2005] ECR I-11087, respectively.
83 P. Gottfried & W. Wiegard go so far as to state that ‘contrary to common belief, VAT no longer equals a consumption tax when exemptions are granted’, in ‘Exemption 
versus Zero-Rating – A Hidden Problem of VAT’, Journal of Public Economics 46, no. 3 (1991): 307-328, at 308.
84 See D. Butler, ‘VAT as a Tax on Consumption: Some Thoughts on the Recent Judgement in Parker Hale Ltd v. Customs and Excise Commissioners’, British Tax Review 5 (2000): 
545-553.
85 As highlighted by M. Aujean et al., n. 2 above, at 145.
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Zeeuws Vlaanderen, a case concerning the right to deduct 
of public sector bodies:
It is inherent in the existence of exceptions to the VAT 
system that they will interfere to some extent with the 
application of the principles of neutrality and of equal-
ity treatment. Whatever the merits of the decision to 
treat public sector bodies as fi nal consumers, it forms 
an integral part of the Directive. In that in comparable 
situations, the treatment of taxable persons and per-
sons excluded from the VAT system will inevitably be 
different.86
3.2. Economic Consequences
Tax Cascading
One of the main side effects of treating activities as out-
side the scope of VAT or exempt, and the consequent non-
deductibility of related input VAT, is the possibility of 
tax cascading.87 Tax cascading will occur where the serv-
ice supplied by the public sector body is an intermediate 
step in the production, and therefore, the VAT levied until 
then becomes a hidden cost (as it cannot be deducted). 
The higher the VAT rate applicable to input supplies, the 
potentially higher the amount of hidden VAT included 
in the supplies of services by public bodies. Moreover, 
according to economic commentators, this is especially 
true in the case of public services.88 This is all the more 
important when considering that avoiding tax cascading 
effects is, not only one of the main principles of commod-
ity  taxation,89 but equally one of the principal reasons 
behind the introduction of the EU VAT system.90
Erosion of VAT Base/Break of VAT Chain
Connected to the problem of tax cascading is another 
negative consequence of the current EU VAT treatment 
of public sector bodies. Whilst, it is widely accepted 
within the economic literature that VAT effi ciency lev-
els are directly related to its taxable base,91 the current 
regime erodes the VAT base and breaks the VAT chain. 
Moreover, some authors have drawn attention to the 
phenomenon of ‘creeping exemptions’. They contest that, 
as more  exemptions are granted, other sectors of the econ-
omy will be tempted to claim exemptions for themselves 
thus further eroding the tax base.92 As regards the activi-
ties of public sector bodies, this phenomenon is particular 
evident in the recent ECJ case-law concerning intermedi-
ary and sub-contracted services.93
Self-supplies versus Outsourcing: Bias Away from 
 Outsourcing
Another important consequence of the current VAT treat-
ment of public sector bodies is the fact that it encourages 
self-supplies. The reason is clear: in the case of self-sup-
plies, the public bodies will only have to pay VAT on the 
purchase of goods or services involved; on the contrary, 
where there is outsourcing or subcontracting of services to 
a private entity, VAT will be charged on the full price of 
those services. As the right to deduct input VAT of pub-
lic bodies is limited, VAT charged on outsourced or sub-
contracted activities will represent an extra cost, whilst, 
where there is a self-supply this extra cost will be avoided. 
This bias is all the more serious when considering that 
recent economic literature indicates that contracting out 
government services is economically more effi cient and 
saves taxpayers’ money, with some commentators suggest-
ing as much as 20% savings. Although many have focused 
particularly on refuse collection,94 some economic stud-
ies indicate that the private sector is found to be more 
effi cient in other areas, such as fi re protection, cleaning 
services and waste-water treatment.95
Lack of Effect on Regressivity of VAT
As highlighted above, there is a perception that exclu-
sion of the products supplied by public sector bodies from 
full taxation, achieves social and distributional aims by 
increasing consumption of so-called merit goods, and 
diminishing the natural regressivity of VAT. Yet, the 
effectiveness of this tactic is far from clear. Firstly, in order 
to achieve both these aims the exclusion from the tax base 
must be refl ected in consumer prices, and it is not obvious 
whether this is actually the case. In fact, recent experi-
ments with VAT rates seem to indicate that the opposite 
Notes
86 Case C-378/02, Waterschap Zeeuws Vlaanderen, [2005] ECR I-4685, at para. 38.
87 Also known as ‘multiple taxation’, see G. De Wit, ‘The European VAT Experience’, Tax Notes International 10, no. 2 (1995): 49-54.
88 See economic analysis by P. Gottfried & W. Wiegard, n. 82 above, at 323.
89 See E.H. Davis & J.A. Kay, ‘Extending the VAT Base: Problems and Possibilities’, Fiscal Studies 6, no. 1 (1985): 1-16, at 4.
90 See The EEC Reports on Tax Harmonisation – The Report of the Fiscal and Financial Committee and the Report of the Sub-Groups A, B and C (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 1963).
91 See S. Cnossen, ‘Is the VAT’s Sixth Directive Becoming an Anachronism?’, European Taxation 12 (2003): 434-442, at 435.
92 See A.A. Tait, Value Added Tax – International Practice and Problems (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 1988), 50.
93 See Section 2.2.1.
94 See E. Dijkgraaf & R.H.J.M. Gradus, ‘Cost Savings of Contracting Out Refuse Collection’, Empirica 30 (2003): 149-161.
95 For a detailed overview of these studies see M.C. Wassenaar & R.H.J.M. Gradus, ‘Contracting Out: The Importance of a Solution for the VAT Distortion’, CESifo Economic 
Studies 50, no. 2 (2004): 377-396.
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is true.96 Secondly, it is widely accepted by economic com-
mentators that indirect taxes are not an effective means of 
pursuing distributional goals, and it is far more effi cient 
to tax as broadly as possible, using the yield to compensate 
low-income house-holds.97
Finally, two additional points regarding the economic 
effects of the current EU VAT treatment of public sector 
bodies. First, in light of the all-time goal of the effi cient 
allocation of resources by Governments, it is worth not-
ing that all the diffi culties highlighted here place extra 
costs and economic ineffi ciencies upon bodies, which are 
by nature funded by the taxpayer. Moreover, these costs 
should be put in the context of budgetary restraints – 
including, but not exclusively those resulting from the 
Economic and Monetary Union and the Stability and 
Growth Pact – which should imply not only cutting 
fi scal spending, but equally levying taxes more effi -
ciently.98 Secondly, it is also important to note that some 
of the problems highlighted here, which arise from the 
VAT treatment of public sector bodies, apply equally in 
relation to the private bodies benefi ting from the same 
exemptions, such as charities and other non-governmental 
organizations. Moreover, the application of exemptions to 
private bodies may give rise to additional problems, such 
as signifi cant loss of revenue.99
4.  ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
Although in most countries the activities and transactions 
undertaken by public sector bodies are prima facie treated 
as VAT exempt or outside the scope of VAT, there are some 
notable exceptions, namely Canada, Australia and New Zea-
land. Canada applies a modifi ed exemption system, whilst 
Australia and New Zealand fully tax most of the activities 
undertaken by public bodies, with some exceptions.
4.1. Refund Schemes
The regime applied in Canada is, in its essence, an 
exemption system: most public sector bodies’ activi-
ties are exempt, although some may be taxable, or zero-
rated; input VAT related to exempt activities will not be 
deductible. However, the Canadian VAT system departs 
from the traditional systems by granting a rebate of that 
input tax. The rebate scheme constitutes a feature of the 
Canadian system since its inception, in recognition of the 
 diffi culties arising from exemptions, in particular the bias 
towards self-supply; compliance costs are said to be aver-
age, whilst revenue effects are negative.100 In Europe, sim-
ilar schemes sometimes apply, but at the national, rather 
than the European, level.
In fact, with a view to counteracting the bias towards 
self-supplies and away from outsourcing, some Member 
States, namely Denmark, Finland, Sweden, the Nether-
lands and the United Kingdom, have opted for fi nancing 
the VAT costs of public sector bodies through the intro-
duction of a refund mechanism. Usually operating outside 
the VAT regime,101 these refund or compensation schemes 
aim to create a level playing fi eld between self-supply of 
services and outsourcing.102 Whilst they vary considerably, 
the refund schemes generally apply to local governments, 
but VAT compensation may also operate at the level of 
central government.103
The question is, therefore, whether the current EU 
VAT treatment of public sector bodies should be modi-
fi ed to include a refund scheme, similar to that applied 
in Canada, which would consequently be applicable in 
all Member States. Overall, studies seem to indicate that 
in general these schemes are having an impact on pub-
lic sector bodies’ choices, with the level of outsourcing 
of  governmental activities increasing in Member States 
where refund schemes apply.104 However, despite their 
Notes
96 In particular the so-called ‘labour-intensive experiment’, implemented in 1999, and whose aim was to test the impact of reduced rates of VAT on job creation. In 2003, a 
report from the Commission confi rmed that the impact of the introduction of reduced rates of VAT on prices was minimal: when conducting price surveys, Member States 
found that reduced rates of VAT were refl ected in consumer prices only partially or not at all and that at least part of the VAT reduction was used to increase the margins of 
service providers; where the VAT reduction had been passed on to the consumer Member States found that this was only a temporary measure and prices would subsequently 
increase – see Experimental Application of a Reduced Rate of VAT to Certain Labour-Intensive Services, Report from the Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament, 
COM(2003) 309 fi nal, 2 Jun. 2003. 
97 See A.A. Tait, n. 91 above, at 218. See also C.L. Ballard & J.B. Shoven, ‘The Value-Added-Tax: The Effi ciency Cost of Achieving Progressivity by Using Exemptions’, in 
Modern Development in Public Finance: Essays in Honor of Arnold Harberger, ed. M.J. Boskin (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1987), 109-129; and E.H. Davis & J.A. Kay, who provide 
amusing examples, illustrating the shortcomings of using the VAT structure as a mean to diminish its regressivity, n. 88 above, at 11-12.
98 See B. Genser & P. Winker, ‘Measuring the Fiscal Revenue Loss of VAT Exemption in Commercial Banking’, FinanzArchiv 54, no. 4 (1997): 563-585, at 563.
99 Whether or not public sector bodies are taxable is rather irrelevant from a strictly revenue point of view, as the payments on one side of the account will be balanced by col-
lections on the other side, thus it can be said that it is merely a bookkeeping operation. However, the loss of revenue in relation to private sector bodies might be extremely 
relevant, see R. de la Feria, n. 51 above, at 76-78.
100 For a detailed analysis of the Canadian system, see P.P. Gendron, n. 3 above, at 518-520.
101 Although, reportedly not in Finland, where the provisions allowing for VAT compensation are included within the VAT legislation, see X. Yang, ‘VAT Treatment of Govern-
ment Procurement: A Comparative Analysis’, International VAT Monitor 5 (2005): 342-348, at 346.
102 Although no connection has been directly established between tax cascading and the introduction of VAT refund schemes, presumably these schemes would also have the 
side effect of preventing any cascading. The rationale for introduction of such schemes has however been heavily criticized, see W. van der Corput, ‘Hollow-Sounding Argu-
ments’, International VAT Monitor 2 (2005): 92-93.
103 Generally a global distinction can be made between open and closed models; for a more detailed view of the several types of refund schemes applied see M.C. Wassenaar & 
R.H.J.M. Gradus, n. 94 above, and H. van Dijk & G. Lubbers, ‘The VAT Compensation Fun(d)?’, International VAT Monitor 1 (2000): 6-9.
104 See M.C. Wassenaar & R.H.J.M. Gradus, n. 94 above, at Tables 1 and 2. However, the effectiveness of Dutch scheme has been recently placed into question, see 
M.C. Wassenaar, E. Dijkgraaf & R.H.J.M. Gradus, ‘Contracting Out: Dutch Municipalities Reject the Solution for the VAT-Distortion’, Free University Amsterdam, Faculty of 
Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics, Series Research Memoranda No. 3, 2007.
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potential advantages these schemes also give rise to dif-
fi culties, as follows:
– Inclusion or exclusion of non-national VAT – only in the 
Netherlands is refund given for non-national costs; 
this creates inequality between national and non-
national suppliers, as the level playing fi eld is only 
achieved in relation to national suppliers.
– Inclusion or exclusion of exempt activities – in the 
 Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the refund is 
only given for VAT costs relating to outside the scope 
activities, whilst in Denmark, Finland and Sweden 
the refund also applies in relation to exempt activi-
ties. Both options have disadvantages: excluding 
exempt activities from the refund scheme signifi es 
that in relation to these activities VAT considera-
tions will continue to infl uence the choice between 
self-supplies and outsourcing; on the other hand, the 
inclusion of exempt activities within the scope of the 
scheme will lead to an unequal treatment between 
private and public suppliers, as most exemptions will 
also apply to private suppliers.105
– Inequality amongst Member States – the existence of 
these schemes in only some of the Member States 
creates inequality within the Community. Although 
public sector bodies of different Member States will 
typically not be in direct competition, the private 
enterprises offering outsourcing governmental serv-
ices might be. In this context private companies 
established in Member States, which have a refund 
scheme in place, will be at a competitive advantage 
to private companies established in Member States, 
which do not have such a scheme.
These special compensation schemes have traditionally 
been regarded as a purely fi nancial operation and budget-
ary expenditure. As such, the Commission has so far con-
sidered them as falling outside the scope of the EU VAT 
system.106 Yet, consideration should be given to the recent 
ECJ jurisprudence, namely Heiser,107 which indicates the 
Court’s willingness to extend the principles it has devel-
oped as regards state aid to the fi eld of VAT.108 In light of 
the above, and in particular taking into account potential 
distortive effects to intra-Community trade amongst pri-
vate enterprises offering outsourcing governmental serv-
ices, it is conceivable that the Court would regard these 
schemes as illegitimate state aid, in contravention of Arti-
cle 87 of the EC Treaty.
Of course, most of the distortions mentioned above 
could disappear if a refund scheme were to be introduced 
at EU level, thus allowing for a set of harmonized rules to 
dictate compensation to public sector bodies for irrecover-
able input VAT. Would adopting such a scheme constitute 
the best way forward? Firstly, it is worth noting that the 
introduction of a refund scheme applicable to public sec-
tor bodies, but not to exempt private sector traders, would 
have the potential to give rise to signifi cant distortions 
of competition at the internal level (rather than at intra-
Community level, as highlighted above). Second, such a 
measure would constitute a signifi cant departure from the 
fundamental principles of the EU VAT system, as set out 
in the CVSD and developed by the ECJ, in particular the 
principle of the right to deduct. Finally, the introduction 
of this type of schemes would add yet another layer of com-
plexity, to an already immensely convoluted regime.109
4.2. Full Taxation
The Australian and New Zealander GST systems, com-
monly designated as modern VAT systems, are essentially 
an attempt at (almost) full taxation.110 In both countries 
all activities of public bodies are within the scope of 
VAT and are, in principle, fully taxable. Under Austral-
ian GST rules a few exceptions apply: certain activities, 
where undertaken by specifi c bodies, such as government 
schools, will be regarded as zero-rated; and, certain enti-
ties can also opt to be exempt. The New Zealander system 
is not subject to these general exceptions and thus, con-
sidering its system of almost-full taxation of public activ-
ities, it is perhaps unsurprising that the New  Zealander 
system has been hailed as an exemplary model insofar 
as the VAT treatment of these activities is concerned.111 
Common distortions, such as those found under the EU 
Notes
105 Norway operates a similar scheme for non-profi t organizations, see O. Gjems-Onstad, ‘Refund of Input VAT to Norwegian NPOS’, International VAT Monitor 4 (2004): 
244-246.
106 The compatibility of these refund schemes with the CVSD has been subject of a Parliamentary Question; former Commissioner Bolkestein replied on behalf of the Com-
mission that such schemes do not confl ict with the EU VAT system, see Common VAT System – Eighth Directive, Written Question P-2861/99, 7 Jan. 2000, [2000] OJ 
C225E/211.
107 Case C-172/03, Heiser, [2005] ECR I-1627, concerning Austria’s transposition of the exemption applicable to medical services (Art. 132(1)(c) of the CVSD).
108 See J. Swinkels, ‘State aid and VAT’, International VAT Monitor 5 (2005): 311-316.
109 In this regard, it is worthy of notice that the introduction of a VAT compensation scheme in the Netherlands did not have the broad welcome from local authorities that 
might have been expected, with one of the reasons pointed out being the excessive administrative costs it gives rise to, see M.C. Wassenaar, E. Dijkgraaf & R.H.J.M. Gradus, 
n. 103 above, at 12-13.
110 As opposed to ‘traditional VAT systems’, namely those based upon the European model, see R. Krever, n. 6 above, at 13 et seq.
111 See R. Bird & P.P. Gendron, n. 1 above, at 95-97; A. Schenk & O. Oldman, n. 1 above, at 289-290; A.A. Tait, n. 91 above, at 78. This is also refl ected on levels of effi ciency, 
as recent studies carried out by the OECD indicate that New Zealander GST not only possesses by far the highest effi ciency levels of all OECD countries, but equally levels 
which are over double those witnessed in some European countries, including the United Kingdom, see D. Snell, ‘GST – Revenue and Business Risk’, in GST in Retrospect 
and Prospect, eds R. Krever & D. White (Wellington: Thomson Brokers, 2007), 423-430, at 426.
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VAT system, have been eliminated, without an increase 
of administrative and compliance costs, or a decrease in 
revenue.112 Despite a few conceptual diffi culties, namely 
regarding the calculation of the taxable amount in respect 
of certain activities such as subsidies and grants, full 
 taxation offers many advantages and virtually no disad-
vantages (apart from potentially political ones).113 It is 
therefore disappointing that the EU VAT system seems 
further away from full taxation now, than when it was 
when fi rst implemented thirty years ago.
5.  MOVING IN THE WRONG DIRECTION: 
POLITICAL STAGNATION AND LEGAL 
EXTENSION OF CURRENT REGIME
The above alternatives to the current EU VAT treat-
ment of public sector bodies are not without diffi culties. 
Although, for the reasons highlighted above, full taxation 
appears to be the better of the two, arguably either would 
constitute an improvement to the status quo. Moreover, 
other less dramatic amendments to the current regime 
have recently been suggested.114 Ultimately, apart from 
political considerations, there appears to be no good rea-
son, either, conceptual, administrative or budgetary, to 
maintain the current regime. Yet, there appears to be no 
signifi cant progress, and if anything, reform of the cur-
rent regime seems more distant now, than it did only a 
few years previously. Furthermore, recent jurisprudential 
and legislative developments seem to be pointing in the 
opposite direction, towards a deepening, rather than an 
elimination, of current legal and economic distortions.
5.1.  Political Stagnation: Postal 
Services Proposal and Other 
Abandoned Initiatives
In 2003, the Commission put forward a proposal to amend 
the VAT treatment of the postal services, by eliminating 
the current exemption applicable to these services, under 
Article 132(1)(a) of the CVSD, and thus making them 
taxable.115 However, the proposal was the target of criti-
cisms by the European Parliament.116 Further to the Opin-
ion of the European Parliament the Commission decided 
to present an amended proposal,117 which included the 
possibility of applying reduced rates of VAT to postal 
services, in order to avoid or to limit the price increases 
to a minimum. Yet, despite these amendments the dis-
cussions in the Council proved slow, with some Mem-
ber States appearing to strongly oppose it. On 7 January 
2004, during the Prime Minister questions and answers’ 
session in the Parliament, the then UK Prime Minister, 
Tony Blair, confi rmed that his government would con-
tinue to oppose any movement away from VAT exemption 
for postal services. Similarly, in Ireland, the move has not 
been without controversy, as demonstrated by the number 
of written questions addressed by Irish members of the 
European Parliament to the Commission on the contents 
and consequences of the proposal.118 Four years since the 
presentation of the amended proposal, it seems clear that 
its approval is now unlikely.
Meantime, early indications that reform of the current 
EU VAT regime applicable to public sector bodies was to 
be expected in the near future have not been fulfi lled. In 
2000, the Commission published a VAT strategy, aimed 
at improving the operation of the Internal Market. Under 
the heading ‘other potential future priorities’, the Com-
mission set out the areas, which it considered, warranted a 
thorough review. The fi rst item on this list was the treat-
ment of subsidies, public authorities and services in the 
public interest:
Increasing privatisation of activities which were tra-
ditionally the exclusive reserve of the public sector 
has led to greater distortions of competition between 
exempt, non-taxable and taxable services. The VAT sys-
tem for such services needs to be modernised taking 
into account of all interests involved […] Exemptions 
without the right to deduction for social, educational, 
cultural and other activities also need to be reviewed to 
see whether they meet current needs.119
Notes
112 As P. Barrand comments: ‘there are four arguments in particular which supported the proposed method of taxing government departments and local authorities in New 
Zealand. These are administrative simplicity, accountability and transparency of government operations, comprehensiveness of GST coverage and sound economic manage-
ment’, in ‘The Taxation of Non-profi t Bodies and Government Entities under the New Zealand GST’, International VAT Monitor 1 (1991): 1-19, at 2-3.
113 See M. Aujean et al., n. 2 above, at 149; S. Poddar, ‘Application of VAT to Public Bodies’, Paper presented at International Tax Dialogue VAT Conference, Rome, 15-16 Mar. 2005, 
available at: /<www.itdweb.org/VATConference/Pages/PapersPresentations.aspx/>; P.P. Gendron, n. 3 above, at 521-522.
114 See M. Aujean, ‘Application of VAT to Public Bodies: The EU VAT System, Current Issues and Proposals’, in VAT in Africa, ed. R. Krever (Pretoria: Pretoria University 
Press, 2008), 71-79, at 77-79.
115 See Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive 77/388/EEC as regards VAT on services provided in the postal services, COM(2003) 234 fi nal, 5 May 2003.
116 See Report on the proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 77/388/EEC as regards VAT on services provided in the postal sector (COM(2003) 234 – C5-
0227/2003 – 2003/0091(CNS)), A5-0122/2004, 11/03/2004.
117 Amended Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 77/388/EEC as regards Value Added Tax on services provided in the postal sector, COM(2004) 468 fi nal, 
8 Jul. 2004.
118 There has been a total of four written questions, as follows: VAT on postal services, Written Question E-1667/03 by Proinsias De Rossa (PSE) to the Commission, 19 May 2003, 
[2004] OJ C783E/34; Exemption from VAT on postage for charities, Written Question E-2400/03 by Avril Doyle (PPE-DE) to the Commission, 10 Jul. 2003, [2004] OJ C65E/142; 
Consultation with charities with regard to the proposal relating to the imposition of VAT on postal services, Written Question E-3631/03, by Proinsias De Rossa (PSE) to the Commission, 
5 Dec. 2003, [2004] OJ C78E/617; and VAT on postal services, Written Question E-0922/04 by Proinsias De Rossa (PSE) to the Commission, 16 Mar. 2004, [2004] OJ C88E/551.
119 See n. 9 above, at 11.
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The Commission’s intention to reform the VAT treat-
ment of public bodies was again reiterated in 2003, in 
their review and update of the VAT strategy. It stated then 
that preparatory work for reform of this area was already 
under way, and despite its complexity, a fi nal proposal 
would be presented in the fourth quarter of 2004.120 Yet, 
four years on from that date, the Commission has not only 
failed to do so, but equally there are no obvious signs of 
an intention to initiate the consultation process, which 
would usually precede such a move.121 This sequence of 
events raises the obvious question: why does there seem 
to have been an abandonment of the intention to reform 
the VAT treatment of public services? Most of the other 
items listed in the Commission’s review of the VAT strat-
egy seem to have indeed been the subject of a legislative 
proposal, albeit in many cases a belated one.122 It is, of 
course, impossible to answer with any level of certainty, 
but the suspicion is that Member States’ reaction to the 
postal services proposal might have given the Commission 
an inkling as to the political sensitivities involving the 
public services area.
5.2.  Legal Extension of Scope 
of Current Regime: Jurisprudential 
and Legislative Developments
As the case-law analysis undertaken above demonstrates, 
traditionally the approach adopted by the ECJ to the spe-
cial regime applicable to public sector bodies, under the 
CVSD, has been to restrain the scope of its application, 
by giving preference to a strict interpretation of both 
 Article 13 and the exemptions’ provisions, particularly 
those in Article 132. Yet, there are signs of a departure 
from this traditional approach, with the Court increas-
ingly delivering rulings which give preference to non-
strict interpretations of those provisions, in light of the 
principles of fi scal neutrality, and its corollary, the princi-
ple of principle of VAT uniformity, or equal treatment.
Whilst conceptually, this is prima facie a more coher-
ent position, it does gives rise to some diffi culties. Firstly, 
from a conceptual perspective, it is important to remember 
that the Court itself has recognized that the regime cur-
rently applicable to public sector bodies is inherently in 
contravention of fi scal neutrality.123 Thus, applying the 
principle of fi scal neutrality in a somewhat segmented 
manner to a specifi c set of circumstances, on a case-by-
case basis, might not necessarily result in the increased 
neutrality which the Court is aiming for. In a fi eld such 
as taxation, weighing of economic considerations is fun-
damental, yet a simplistic approach to economic matters 
might give rise to additional problems; thus nothing 
short of full economic analysis is often required.124 Sec-
ondly, from a more practical perspective, not only does it 
make ECJ rulings even more unpredictable, thus fuelling 
the climate of legal uncertainty, but equality it has the 
side effect of extending the scope of application of what is 
meant to constitute an exceptional regime in the context 
of the EU VAT system. 
More diffi cult to explain is the ruling in Marktgemeinde 
Welden,125 where the Court adopted a wide interpretation 
of the exempt activities clause in Article 13(2),126 paving 
the way for the amendments which would later emerge 
in the context of the recast of the former Sixth Direc-
tive.127 Presented in 2004, the proposal for the recast of 
the Sixth Directive was intended to simplify and clarify 
existing VAT legislation. Although the Commission rec-
ognized that a number of amendments would have to be 
introduced in the process, it was envisaged that these 
would not be ‘substantive’, amounting to ‘essentially cos-
metic changes’.128 Yet, the wording of the exempt activi-
ties clause in Article 13(2) has been altered, arguably in 
a substantive manner. It can be contested that the new 
wording refl ects more accurately the original ethos of the 
provision, that by treating all exemptions similarly, it is 
in line with the principle of fi scal neutrality, and fi nally 
that the practical consequences of the amendment will be 
minimal. These indeed might all be very good reasons for 
altering the wording of Article 13(2).
This line of argument, however, misses a crucial point: 
the new wording of the provision has de jure enlarged its 
scope. The current VAT treatment of public sector bodies 
is an exception to the general rules of the EU VAT system, 
which gives rise to many undesirable effects. Having to 
Notes
 120 See n. 9 above, at 11 and Annex 2.
121 See, however, comments by M. Aujean, n. 112 above, at 79.
122 The only other item listed in the document, in relation to which there appears to have been no initiative is ‘survey of various options, facilities and transitional provisions’; 
others items listed have also not been subject of proposal as of yet, but consultation processes are currently under way, as it is the case with ‘promotions and payment cards’ 
and ‘elimination of double taxation in individual cases’, see Commission of the European Communities, Public Consultation on ‘Modernising the Value Added Tax Treatment of 
Vouchers and Related Issues’ – Summary of Results, May 2007, and Report on the Outcome of the Consultation on ‘Introduction of a Mechanism for Eliminating Double Imposition of VAT 
in Individual Cases’, Oct. 2007.
123 See Section 2.
124 As I. Roxan clearly demonstrates as regards direct taxation, see ‘Assuring Real Freedom of Movement in EU Direct Taxation’, Modern Law Review 63, no. 6 (2000): 
831-876.
125 Case C-247/95, Welden, [2007] ECR I-779.
126 See detailed analysis of this case undertaken in Section 2.1.2.
127 [1977] OJ L145/1.
 128 Proposal for a Council Directive on the Common System of Value Added Tax (Recast), COM(2004) 246 fi nal, 15 Apr. 2004, at 1-2.
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deal with such a complex and fl awed regime is unfortu-
nate; enlarging its scope of application seems fundamen-
tally unjustifi able.
6. CONCLUSION
Exemptions have been said to be ‘the fundamental 
 structural imperfection of the common VAT system’.129 
Activities undertaken by public sector bodies, however, 
are not all exempt: most are outside the scope of VAT, or 
non-taxable, some are exempt, and yet others are taxable. 
Whilst, exemptions alone would have given rise to many 
diffi culties, a regime as complex as that applicable under 
the EU VAT system is not only a maze of legal pitfalls, 
but has equally the potential to create extra economic 
distortions.
The jurisprudence of the ECJ in relation to the EU 
VAT treatment of public sector bodies is extensive and 
has been moderately successful in providing guidelines, 
which have helped clarify the regime applicable to those 
entities. Yet, it has not been able to resolve most of the 
inherent problems of the current regime, in particular 
those resulting from the limited recovery of input tax; 
nor has it been capable of fully adapting out-dated provi-
sions to new economic realities. Current trends towards 
privatization and intensifi ed competition between public 
and private sectors, and demands for improved effi ciency 
in the provision of public services, leading to increased 
resort to cost saving mechanisms like outsourcing, are 
set to continue. So far, the prevalence of these trends has 
resulted in a signifi cant upsurge in the number of cases 
being referred to the Court, but unfortunately this has 
not translated into any greater legal certainty. Unfortu-
nately, there is no obvious reason to believe that this is 
set to change.
Like other exclusions from the EU VAT base, the cur-
rent regime applicable to public sector bodies owes its 
existence to a conjugation of practical and political fac-
tors which took place over thirty years ago. It is clear that 
the diffi culties, which increasingly arise from the current 
regime, can only be eliminated through radical legisla-
tive reform at EU level. Unfortunately, there appears to 
be a shift in the opposite direction: one towards mainte-
nance, and even extension, of the current regime to further 
activities.
Notes
129 V. Lenoir, ‘April 1954-April 2004 – VAT Exemptions: The Original Misunderstanding’, European Taxation 10 (2004): 456-459, at 459.
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